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SOCIAL PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS AND THE
DICHOTOMY ARGUMENT: A COMMENT
FRANKLIN R. SHUPP
In his intriguing paper, "On the Specification of Unemployment and In-
flation in the Objective Function," Carl Palash observes that "a dichotomy
between preferences and constraints is a standard assumption of welfare
theory." A straightforward application of this observation requires that
any social preference function which is to be maximized should be speci-
fied more or less independently of the macroeconomic model which serves
as its constraint set.
Unfortunately when Palash applies this independence doctrine iii a
series of simulations, the resulting optimal policy behavior generates a
minor depression. Two explanations are apparent: (i) an independent
specification of the social preference function is not always appropriate,
and (ii) the basic macroeconomic model used is incomplete. These ex-
planations are considered separately below.
I. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PREFERENCES AND CONSTRAINTS
Palash defines both a strong and a weak dichotomy between preference
functions and thUtderlying economic model or constraint set, The
strong dichotomy tequires that the target values for the arguments of the
preference function be determined independently of the constraint st.
The weak dichotomy requires that these targets be defined by thequi-
librium or steady-state levels implied by the underlying economic model.
The strong dichotomy appears to have only a very limited applica-
bility. Consider, for example, a simple two person two commodity world
ii which each person has an initial endowment of commodity one. In this
situation a Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained by maximizing
(1)
subject to
where
Ui =
U2U2(x12,x22) = U2(x2,O) =
x2 = x21 + x22 = fi(x1)
x1 = x + x2 - (x11 + xj2),
x1 = the quantity of the1th commodity held by theJth
consumer,
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295the initial endowment of the first commodity held
by the1th consumer,
U(x,1, x,2) =theth consumer's utility function
X2f1(x1)the relevant production function.
The sameParetooptimal allocation obtains from maximizing
U(x,x) + X[U2(x2,x22) - Ufl2
subject to(ii) and(iii) above, Anarbitrarily large A is assumed.
Twoinsights areimmediately apparent. First, since a constraint can
feque11tly beformulated as an argumentin the criterion function (and
vice versa),anyassumption positingstrict independence between the two
needs tobecarefully examined,Secondly, since the two specifications of
theproblem areequally valid, thesecond formulation can be analyzed
without
prejudicing the argument.
Note thatthe targetlevel U of equation (2) is related to the endow-
mentlevel x.
consequently U2 is not independent of the constraint set
(ii) and(iii). Theweak dichotomy obtains, however, because choosing a
target valueless thanU = U2(x, 0) can not beconsistent with any
quilibrat1
mechanism (market orother), since consumer 2 can always
elect t0retain hisinitial endowment x. Note also that an exogenous in-
**
crease inthe endowmentto Ximplies a new target value U2
II. TARGETS
AND THEINFLATIONUNEMPLOYMENT POLICY MODEL
In thestandard textbookpresentation,' the policy decision process
requires
aximizi11g asocial preference function given by
UU(p,u)
subject to amodified Phillips curvegiven by
pp +f2(u* - u),
pw - prandwp + pr + f2(u* - u),
where
percentage price increase orinflation rate
peexpected percentageprice increase
wpercentage money wageincrease
prpercentageproductivity increase
u
nemployme11t rate
= targetedunemployment rate.
A strong
ichOt0mY isimplied by this formulation of the problem since
See forexamP
Peacock & ShaW(1971), especially pp. 152-159.
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296the implicit target values of the preference function arep= u= 0, and
these are independent of(iv). The graphical solution to the decision prob-
lem is given by point A in figure1 below. Presumably point A is reached
by some suitable combination of monetary and fiscal policy.
A more complete specification of the basic macroeconomic model
includes equation (iv) as a reduced form supply side relationship and
equation (v) immediately below as a reduced form demand side relation-
ship. This demand relationship is given by
(v) p=af3(u_u*)+flg+,ym+,
whereg = percentage deviation in government expenditures from its
equilibrium level and
m = percentage deviation in money supply from the equilibrium
level required to accommodate non-inflationary growth.
Equation (v) itself derives from the following standard equilibrium condi-
tion in the commodity and money markets.
y = a0 + a1g + a2i
m - p = m1y - m2i
and
y = f3(u - u*)
wherey = percentage deviation from the long run full employment
(u = u*) GNP and
= interest rate deviation
Unemployment Rate, u
Figure I
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297The demandand supplyrelationships
given by (v)and (iv) respec-
tively can begraphed asin figure2. Theequilibrium atpoint B defines
the naturalunemployment
and inflationrates. Thenatural unemployment
rate urepresents
the levelof frictionaland structuralunemployment
which can notbe furtherreducedwithoutescalating therate of inflation
abovep*. Thenon-zeroinflationratep* obtainsin equilibriumbecause of
aheterogeneous
labormarket,downward wageresistance, the relative
wagephenomenon,
and otherinstitutionalconsiderations.
There appears
to be nological reasonfor solutionA and the equilib
rium solutionB to bethe same.Solution Bis anequilibrium which obtains
when all ofthe agentsof theeconomy(including thegovernment andthe
central bank)behavein somenormal oraverage manner.This implies
that 5g0 and m = p.If, on theother hand, theeconomic
agents intheprivate sectorbecomepessimistic,aggregatedemand is de-
pressed belowthe levelnecessaryto sustainfull employment.Algebrai
cally this canberepresentedby anegative a0and/or 5. Thisimplies a dis-
equilibriumdownward
shift in(v) to (V).However, sincethe demand
relationship isparametric
with respectto monetaryand fiscal policy,these
instruments canbe usedto return() to(v), and restorethe full employ-
mentequilibriumB. Indeedthese sameexpansionary policiescan be
pursued evenmorevigorously toachieve, atleast temporarily,solution A.
This bringsus tothe finalrelationshipof the model.Heretofore, we
haveassumedthat theexpectedihflation rateis determinedexogenously
Clearly thisis not avalidequilibriUm
assumption. Inthe long run, whether
p**
p*
298
0
u*
Unemployment
Rate,U
Figure 2
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Figure 2expectations are formed rationally or adaptively, the only viable equilib-
rium condition is thatpe =* Since solution A impliesan inflation
rate p > pep* which is implicit in (iv), an upward shift in (iv) is im-
plied over the long run.
Conversely if the existing inflationary expectation rate pe equals
> p*, the appropriate supply relationship is given by (iv'). Simultan-
eously since we have defined normal or equilibrium behavior for the cen-
tral bank as maintaining the target level of real balances, i.e., m' =
pep** the appropriate demand relationship is given by (v'). Thecor-
responding equilibrium is C with target values uand The condition
pep** is not a disequilibrium phenomenon (as is, e.g., a depressed
value of ) because there exists no inherent market pressure to return pe to
p*. Furthermore since fiscal and monetary policies are essentially demand
oriented, neither policy exerts any direct influence on the supply rela-
tionship (iv'). In this situation the target set (p*, u*) is appropriate in the
short run only if one is willing to consider an incomes policy whose pri-
mary objective is to decrease inflationary expectations, and therefore shift
(iv') back to (iv); otherwise the appropriate target set is (p**, u*).
In the very long run (p*, u*) may be a legitimate target set, but only
if one is willing to employ restrictive, monetary and fiscal policies long
enough to alter inflationary expectations. In this case however a very long
planning horizon is required.
It should be evident from the above discussion that the strong
dichotomy argument is never appropriate, and that the targets defined by
the weak dichotomy argument must always be stated in terms of the in-
herent equilibrating mechanism of the system. Long run or historical
norms are not necessarily good proxies for targets defined in this way.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS
In his optimization studies Palash uses the rather detailed MPS model
as his constraint set. For much of the period 197 1-75, a plausible analog
to this MPS model is the system given by the set of equations (iv') and (v')
in figure 2. As shown immediately above in this case the target setap-
propriate to the social preference function is (p**, u*). Since Palash uses
the target sets (0,0) and (p*, u*), it is not surprising that his simulation
results have little intuitivappeal. If the implicit expectation relationship
in the MPS model had a shorter lag structure or if an incomes policy had
been entertained, the target set (p*, u*) would have yielded more satis-
factory results.
It is incorrect to conclude that the dichotomy problem is entirely
responsible for the "unacceptable" depression indicated in Palash's sim-
ulations. Two other sources can be readily identified. First, Palash, chose
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299to arbitrarily constrainthe Treasury billrate and federalnon-defense non-wage expenditures Amore satisfactory solutionwould have obtained had he instead chosento penalize the deviationof these policyvariables from some target level.Of much greatersignificance, however, isthe fact that the MPS modeldoes not differentiatesufficiently between fixedand flexible price sectors, Thisdistinction is criticallyimportant for the period studied. If the MPSmodel had beendisaggregated along theselines Palash could have used theinflation rates in thefixed and flexibleprice sectors as separate arguments in hispreference function, Sinceinflation in the flexi- ble price sector ismore short-lived and alsoprovides a substaitialincen- tive toward efficientallocation, the penaltyassociated withnon-targeted inflation rates in thisector should be fairly light.This modificationwould have significantlydampened themore restrictive policymeasures indi- cated in Palash's simulations.
Finally we note thatPalash correctlyidentifies the potentialfor symmetric preference functions(such as the quadraticform) to bias policy behavior. If theappropriate target set isemployed this potentialis mini- mized. In somecases little or no bias isintroduced. If,e.g., a quadratic criterion function is used,this would implya preference functionconsist- ing of concentricelipses about pointC in figure 2. In thisevent a bias is introduced wheneverp <por u < u. However, giventhe shape of (iv') this event doesnot appear to bevery probable. Nonethelesssymmetric specifications in the preferencefunction constitutea problem whichwar- rants considerable additionalstudy.
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